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INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium explores our flexibility within international copyright law to 
better serve the purposes of copyright and, specifically, to benefit the individual 
human creators (authors) of our cultural and intellectual heritage.1  Where other 
contributions consider the potential for a different allocation of rights, here I 
explore the potential for author-centered copyright enforcement:  could we frame 
copyright enforcement practices and remedies with the explicit goal of promoting 
the interests of authors?  Could enforcement reform avoid the zero-sum game that 
pits homogenous and undifferentiated “copyright interests” (authors and 
publishers) against the rest of the world (commercial infringers, users, 
intermediaries, and others)?  The international legal framework governing 
copyright enforcement is relatively open-textured.  It is worth at least considering 
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 1.  “Authors” here is used in the copyright law understanding, extending to all human creators of 
copyright-protected subject matter, including artists, computer programmers, composers, etc.  See Jane 
Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2003) (“in 
copyright law, an author is (or should be) a human creator who, notwithstanding the constraints of her 
task, succeeds in exercising minimal personal autonomy in her fashioning of the work”).  I acknowledge 
that human creators extend beyond this set, to include performers, but am not focused on their potential 
claims to consideration.  See generally Ruth Towse, The Singer or the Song? Developments in 
Performers’ Rights from the Perspective of a Cultural Economist, 3 REV. LAW & ECON. 745 (2007).  
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whether we could tailor civil enforcement procedures and remedies so that authors 
can win without ever more draconian enforcement.2 
Apart from certain very specific contexts—such as moral rights3—authors are 
rarely recognised as having interests in enforcement distinct from those of other 
right holders.  But although authors and cultural intermediaries (publishers, record 
companies, and other disseminators of content) “do market battle shackled one to 
another as they do battle with users” with the “prime aim” of “driv[ing] away 
pirates and freeloaders and [extracting] returns from licensees,”4 their interests 
when infringement is alleged are not co-extensive.  The division of risks and 
rewards in litigation can reflect well-known imbalances in bargaining power 
between authors and disseminators.5  Contracts may allocate significant litigation 
risk to authors, while allocating litigation decision-making and rewards to the entity 
that owns copyright.6  Authors have distinct moral claims, and personal interests 
not likely to be felt with the same intensity by publishers or record companies.7  
Further, needs and desires of authors can conflict with those of investors.8  
I have argued elsewhere for better recognition of the personhood and interests of 
defendants in thinking about copyright procedures and remedies9 and, in other 
 
 2.  Copyright infringement is also, in some circumstances, a criminal offence. Whilst more 
consequential for defendants, in general, criminal enforcement cannot be relied upon by authors:  illegal 
activity can be brought to the attention of authorities, but pursuit and prosecution is ultimately at the 
discretion of the state, and in most systems, monetary judgement or penalty flows to the state.  Criminal 
enforcement is therefore not a focus here. 
 3. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised 
July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 
https://perma.cc/A8MA-9CGV [hereinafter Berne Convention].  
 4.  William Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2002). 
 5.  On these imbalances, see generally RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS 
BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE (2000) (outlining reasons for imbalances in negotiating power as 
between individual creators and the larger investors); Ruth Towse, Copyright and Cultural Policy for 
the Creative Industries, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 427, 427 (Ove Granstrand 
ed., 2003) ([f]irms in the creative industries are able to “free-ride” on the willingness of artists to create 
and the structure of artists’ labour markets, characterised by short term working practices and 
oversupply, mak[ing] it hard for artists to appropriate rewards.); Ruth Towse, Copyright and Economic 
Incentives: An Application to Performers’ Rights in the Music Industry, 52 KYKLOS 369 (1999) 
[hereinafter Towse, Performers’ Rights] (discussing the principal/agent relationship between authors and 
publishers). 
 6.  Stop Forcing Authors to Take Unlimited Financial Risks, THE AUTHORS GUILD (Dec. 18, 
2015), https://perma.cc/9R86-7L87 (highlighting contracts that require authors to give indemnities to 
publishers against suits for copyright infringement, defamation/libel/slander etc. . .). 
 7.  These are generalities, although some publishers are no doubt personally attached to their 
publications.  Further, not all authors have the same kinds of interests.  See Martin Senftleben, 
Copyright, Creators and Society’s Need for Autonomous Art–the Blessing and Curse of Monetary 
Incentives, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 25 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee 
Weatherall eds., 2017) (discussing different interests of the popular artist and the member of the avante 
garde).  For examples of intra-artist conflicts, see generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 
1992) (appropriation artist against commercial photographer); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 
2013) (appropriation artist against anthropologist photographer). 
 8.  Academic authors’ desire for maximum dissemination is an obvious example, but another 
would be the potential conflict around the value of scarcity in the visual arts.  See CAVES, supra note 5. 
 9.  Kimberlee Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges Concerning Enforcement and Civil 
Procedure in IP, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: IS IP A LEX 
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earlier work, focused on how we might get better value from the public investment 
in copyright enforcement.10  So my purpose here is not to advocate for a model, but 
rather, to demonstrate that there are author-friendly alternatives to the constant 
upwards ratchet of copyright enforcement reform. 
I. BACKGROUND:  FLEXIBILITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK ON ENFORCEMENT 
One key reason for thinking about author-centered enforcement as part of a 
broader project to tailor copyright to better serve its purposes is that we have 
considerable flexibility in the multilateral conventions to make adjustments to 
remedies and procedures relating to copyright.11  Three treaties are mentioned here.  
The first and most important is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
International Property Rights (“TRIPS”), the WTO IP agreement.12  I also include 
citations to two plurilateral texts which the U.S. and Australia have both negotiated, 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”)13 and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (“TPP”)14, although neither has entered into force or looks likely to do 
so.  These two agreements are useful demonstrations that even in the most detailed 
enforcement provisions proposed to date, there is flexibility in the international 
framework concerning enforcement. 
TRIPS explicitly allows legislatures to think about the goals of copyright law in 
framing enforcement,15 affirming that “[t]he protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should [be] conducive to social and economic welfare, 
 
SPECIALIS? 181 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2015) (highlighting important substantive concerns and 
values discussed in the general academic literature on procedures and the justice system such as the need 
to respect the rights of all participants in legal procedures and facilitate participation by 
plaintiffs/claimants and defendants/respondents so that they are invested in the result even if adverse to 
their interests.  I argued that unless we bring this other set of values into our thinking, we risk focusing 
only on the needs of IP rights holders, and treating defendants as the means to an end.) 
 10.  Kimberlee Weatherall, A Reimagined Approach to Copyright Enforcement from a Regulator’s 
Perspective, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 281, 294–312 (Rebecca Giblin & 
Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017) (imagining how a public copyright enforcer might act). 
 11.  See Kimberlee Weatherall, Safeguards for Defendant Rights and Interests in International 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Treaties, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 211 (2016) (on which this Part 
draws).  
 12.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 41-61, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 13.  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature Oct. 1, 2011 (not in force) 
[hereinafter ACTA].  ACTA was negotiated by Australia, Canada, the E.U., Japan, Mexico, Morocco, 
New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and the U.S., but has not reached, and seems unlikely to reach, 
sufficient ratifications to bring it into force. 
 14.  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement [hereinafter TPP].  The TPP was negotiated to 
completion but rejected by the U.S. under President Trump.  Negotiations among remaining parties 
continue with a view to bringing it into force without the U.S. 
 15.  Weatherall, supra note 11, 228-30 (arguing that copyright purposes are relevant to 
understanding the enforcement treaty provisions); Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means 
to Counteract Failures in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L. J. 1, 25 (2011) (“International 
law permits using remedies, as proposed here, as a method of correcting some of copyright law’s most 
fundamental flaws”); Antony Taubman, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO WORKING WITH TRIPS 109–10 (2011). 
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and to a balance of rights and obligations.”16  It is therefore legitimate to consider 
the interests of authors in framing and applying enforcement provisions, at least 
within the bounds of any mandatory language. 
TRIPS sets out detailed requirements for enforcement procedures that Member 
States must provide, including civil judicial procedures and remedies available to 
right holders,17 “so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement.”18  
These must include specified remedies “to prevent infringement” and as a 
deterrent.19  But although detailed, TRIPS’ enforcement provisions are carefully 
drafted to preserve domestic sovereignty over practice and procedure, and for the 
most part, elements of this drafting have persisted even as provisions have become 
more detailed in later bilateral and plurilateral trade and intellectual property 
agreements.20  This is consistent with the general principle that Member States are 
free to determine the appropriate method of implementation within their own legal 
system and practice.21  In general, TRIPS remedies and procedures require only 
that national courts have the authority to make certain orders or grant certain 
remedies.  For example, TRIPS article 45.1 (Damages) requires that the courts shall 
have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages.  This is 
not an obligation to exercise authority in every case.22  Importantly, the details are 
left to domestic courts and legislatures:  while damages must be “adequate to 
compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered,” the methods of calculating 
monetary awards are not governed by TRIPS.  Even in the more recent 
international trade and IP texts, it is rare to see provisions set down when or how 
such authority ought to be exercised.23  In most cases, these texts adopt similar 
 
 16.  TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 7.  See also TPP, supra note 14, art. 18.2; ACTA, supra note 13, 
art. 2.3 (incorporating TRIPS art. 7) (emphasis supplied).  
 17.  TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 42.  The “right holder” is the IP (including copyright) owner.  A 
footnote extends the concept to include federations and associations having legal standing (under 
domestic law) to assert such rights.  The civil procedures and remedies are set out in articles 43–50. 
 18.  Taubman, supra note 15, at 110 (stating “an essential negotiating impetus for TIRPS lay in 
the call for effective enforcement”); Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc WT/DS362/R 52 (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter 
US–China Panel Report] (stating that “one of the major reasons for the conclusion of the TRIPs 
Agreement was a desire to set out a minimum set of procedures and remedies”). 
 19.  TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 41.1.  See also ACTA, supra note 13, art. 7.   
 20.  See Weatherall, supra note 11, at 266–75. 
 21.  See TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 1.1.  See also ACTA, supra note 13, art. 2.1; TPP, supra note 
14, art. 18.5.  This reflects the fact that these enforcement provisions must accommodate a wide range of 
different judicial and administrative systems and avoid creating a distinct procedural and remedial 
system applying only to IP cases.  See William R. Cornish et al., Procedures and Remedies for 
Enforcing IPRs: The European Commission’s Proposed Directive, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. R. 448 (2003) 
(arguing for consistency across areas of private or civil law).  See generally Taubman, supra note 15, at 
109–10; Weatherall, supra note 11. 
 22. US–China Panel Report, supra note 18, at ¶ 8.1.  See also Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002). 
 23. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 50.2 (specifying that provisional measures inaudita 
altera parte may be appropriate where delay is “likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder” or 
where there is a “demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed”).  A rare example of a provision that 
requires an order be made is art. 13.1 of the E.U. IP Enforcement Directive, requiring that member 
states “shall ensure that the competent judicial authorities, on application of the injured party, order the 
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drafting providing only that courts must have the authority to make certain orders, 
both in relation to damages24 and other remedies.25  Even in cases where newer 
provisions have, for example, required that courts take into account certain 
considerations in granting remedies (for example, the retail price of goods), treaty 
text does not preclude legislatures from taking into account other considerations 
(like author interests).26  Finally, Member States are entitled to go further than the 
treaty texts,27 meaning states interested in benefiting authors could propose 
additional remedies specifically targeted to them. 
In short, the international legal framework in copyright allows national 
legislatures and courts to consider author interests in framing and applying 
remedies or provide additional remedies beyond those provided for in the treaties 
specifically targeted to benefit human authors.  It is not, of course, infinitely 
malleable, but there is room for author-centered enforcement. 
II. COULD WE PUT AUTHORS AT THE HEART OF ENFORCEMENT? 
What would this look like?  Not like our current system.  Over the last two 
decades, authors’ limited incomes have been used to justify many new, more 
expansive enforcement policies:28  anti-circumvention laws, expanded actions 
against intermediaries, experiments with direct enforcement against individual file-
sharers and graduated response, website-blocking injunctions, and follow-the-
money approaches focused on advertising and payment providers.29  But 
policymakers often fail to ask whether specific reforms actually benefit authors,30 
putting faith in a kind of “trickle down copyright,” where stronger publishers lead 
to more or better-remunerated human creators.  Authors are also rarely visible as 
stakeholders in academic discussion of copyright enforcement.31  Recent scholarly 
 
infringer” to pay damages.  Directive 2004/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 23 [hereinafter 
E.U. IP Enforcement Directive]. 
 24.  See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 13, art. 9.1-2, 9.4-5; TPP, supra note 14, art. 18.74.3. 
 25. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 50; ACTA, supra note 13, art. 8.1; TPP, supra note 14, 
art. 18.75.2-3 (establishing obligations to provide for provisional measures drafted in similar terms).  On 
injunctions, see, e.g., TPP, supra note 14, art. 18.74.2 (stating the power to issue injunctions in similar 
terms); TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 44.1, 50.1-3. 
 26.  TPP, supra note 14, art. 18.74.4; ACTA, supra note 13, art. 9.1.  
 27.  TRIPS, supra note 12, art 1.1. 
 28. Recent studies of author incomes in Australia suggest an overall decline.   See, e.g., Jan Zwar, 
David Throsby & Thomas Longden, Australian authors - Industry Brief No. 3: Authors’ Income, 
MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY, https://perma.cc/RVL7-D4BU. 
 29.  See Weatherall, supra note 10 (discussing copyright’s “deterrence death spiral”:  the upward 
trajectory of enforcement and how it might undermine respect for copyright). 
 30.  Serious cost-benefit analysis of enforcement initiatives, or ex post assessment of whether they 
worked and why, are the exception rather than the rule.  Weatherall, supra note 10, at 284. 
 31.  Cf. patent scholarship considering whether remedies should be tailored to provide incentives 
for invention and technological development.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup 
and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1991, 2036 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEXAS L REV. 1031 (2005); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575  (2003); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ 
Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-
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work looks at the industry-level (not author-level) impact of infringement;32 
whether efforts to reduce online infringement have been effective; at the political 
economy promoting these innovations;33 and how other interests, such as freedom 
of expression or open innovation, are affected.34  To change this dynamic, we need 
to demonstrate that we can benefit creators specifically via alternatives not 
involving more draconian and intrusive measures. 
Authors are also absent from international legal texts on enforcement.  TRIPS’ 
enforcement provisions do not mention authors or human creators, conferring all 
procedural rights and remedies on right holders (i.e. owners).35  The E.U. IP 
Enforcement Directive in its recitals may place human creators front and centre of 
its rationales, stating in Recital 2 that “[t]he protection of intellectual property 
should allow the inventor or creator to derive a legitimate profit from his/her 
invention or creation.”36  But authors are mentioned in the substantive articles 
precisely once:  in a provision chiefly aimed at extending the Berne Convention’s 
presumption of authorship to a presumption of ownership in favour of other right 
holders whose name appears on the work in the usual manner.37  ACTA, a (failed) 
plurilateral treaty devoted entirely to enforcement, did not refer to authors or 
human creators at all in its preamble, identifying only “right holders, service 
providers, and users” as stakeholders in the IP enforcement system.38 
This is all explicable.  Copyright is a property right:  it is generally the right 
holder who will have standing to enforce it.  That could be the author, but more 
often is their successor in title:  their employer or an intermediary (such as a 
publisher) that specialises in disseminating copyright content.  But by treating right 
holders as an undifferentiated group, we are liable to miss divergences in interests 
among them.  When authors are not at the litigation table, it is their interests most 
likely to be subsumed. 
 
Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private 
Law” Remedies, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 517 (2014). 
 32.  See Stan J. Liebowitz & Richard Watt, How to Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the 
Market for Music? Copyright and its Alternatives, 20 J. OF ECON. SURVEYS 513 (2006). 
 33.  See, e.g., MONICA HORTEN, THE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENIGMA: INTERNET POLITICS 
AND THE ‘TELECOMS PACKAGE’ (2012); Yochai Benkler et al., Social Mobilization and the Networked 
Public Sphere: Mapping the SOPA-PIPA Debate, 32 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 594 (2015). 
 34.  See, e.g., Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in Copyright 
Enforcement Online: Elaborating a Legal Framework for Website Blocking, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 43 
(2016); David Lindsay, Website blocking injunctions to prevent copyright infringements: 
Proportionality and effectiveness, 40 U.N.S.W. L. J. 1507 (2017) (examining human rights and other 
implications of website blocking); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO 
STOP IT (2008) (considering impact of anti-circumvention law on innovation). 
 35.  TRIPS’ other substantive provisions mention authors only once, in conferring rental rights.  
See TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 11.  However, TRIPS art. 9.1 imports most of the substantive provisions 
of the Berne Convention and, by so doing, confers a wide range of rights directly on authors of 
copyright works.  
 36.  E.U. IP Enforcement Directive, supra note 23, at Recital 2.  
 37.  E.U. IP Enforcement Directive, supra note 23, art. 5 and Recital 19.  
 38.  ACTA, supra note 13.  ACTA too mentions authors in its substantive provisions only once, in 
ACTA art 27.5 (reproducing text from the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, 
opened for signature Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 63 (WCT) (art 10.1) on anti-circumvention law).  
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We can think of the author as a distinct stakeholder in enforcement in two ways: 
as a risk-sharer in the creative economic enterprise, and as the bearer of distinct 
moral and personal interests not shared by other actors in that enterprise.  
Conceptually disentangling authorial and investor interests through these lenses 
could reveal ways we might make adjustments to procedures and remedies to better 
serve authors. 
A. THE AUTHOR AS RISK-SHARER 
Copyright infringement is a tort, or civil wrong, giving the wronged party a right 
to an injunction against continuing infringement, to compensation for harms 
suffered, and to restoration, so far as possible, to the position they would have been 
in but for the infringement.  This is reflected in the award of damages, usually 
quantified as lost sales or license fees.39  Importantly it is not just the right holder 
or owner of copyright who can suffer loss as a result of infringement.  The 
independent author is (often) a risk-sharer in the creative business enterprise of a 
cultural intermediary.40  An author may receive a lump sum payment for their 
creative efforts:  in such a case, their direct economic risk persists up to the point of 
acceptance of the final work.41  More typical in some industries is a relationship 
that provides authors with a direct financial interest (and share of the risk) via the 
payment of royalties by a cultural intermediary (e.g. publisher).42 
To the extent that damages awards (or equivalent sums paid in settlement) are 
intended to restore the plaintiff to the position they would have been in without the 
defendant’s breach, then authors who receive a royalty are also entitled to 
compensation.  Legal systems around the world also commonly require an infringer 
to disgorge their profits, often as an alternative to the payment of compensation.  
To the extent that such disgorgement goes beyond compensation, the idea is to 
make sure the defendant cannot profit from their wrong.  There seems to be no 
reason in principle why authors who share the risk associated with their creative 
works ought not similarly share any profits handed over:43  they too, perhaps more 
than the investor, contributed to the infringer’s profits. 
 
 39.  Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.) ss 115(3)–(4) (Austl.); 17 U.S.C. § 504; Bailey v. Namol 
Pty Ltd. (1994) 53 FCR 102, 111 (Austl.). 
 40.  Cornish, supra note 4.  This subsection is focused on independent authors.  Employed 
authors, such as some journalists, are still risk-sharers in that they share in the overall risk of business 
success or failure.  As a risk-sharer, the author has an economic interest in the success of the investor’s 
exploitation of their work.  Arguments in this part, however, do not apply well where an author’s 
economic well-being does not depend on their particular works.  
 41.  Although arguably in such a case, the author may still share some reputational risk arising 
from the way their work is presented and disseminated.  
 42.  RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS OR FOES?, 88-89 (2000).  
For reasons why such arrangements make sense on both sides, see TOWSE, supra note 5 (analyzing the 
problem as a principal/agent problem).  These arrangements are less typical of the music industry, where 
composers’ rights are owned by composers and then subject to a compulsory license. This creates a 
different set of problems. 
 43.  See e.g. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.) ss 115(2) (Austl.) (requiring an election between damages 
and an account of profits (disgorgement)). 
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Authors therefore have an interest in enforcement against infringers.  Assuming 
too that the author has less capacity for and experience in litigation, they also have 
an interest in the intermediary taking enforcement action where necessary to protect 
their joint interests.  But this does not mean the author’s interest—or risk 
calculus—in copyright litigation is identical to that of the intermediary.  As this 
discussion makes clear, authors and intermediaries may compete for a share of the 
compensation.  As Ruth Towse points out, we need to pay attention to the 
allocation of risk and reward between intermediary and author.44 
Because it is governed by contract, the details of this allocation are largely 
invisible to scholars and policymakers.  In relation to monetary awards, the 
empirical questions are:  (1) whether contractual arrangements grant authors any 
entitlement to the fruits of enforcement, and (2) whether authors receive anything 
in practice.  Both questions would be difficult to examine:  contracts can vary 
widely, and may be silent or vague on such questions.  What happens in practice is 
hard to ascertain given the relative rarity of copyright litigation, difficulties in 
quantifying the basis for compensatory damages awards, and the fact that monetary 
flows between authors and intermediaries are confidential.  Where multiple 
different works by multiple different authors are involved in enforcement litigation, 
it may not be possible to calculate, with any degree of accuracy, the entitlement to 
compensation for individual authors. 
But if generalisation is not possible, author-centered enforcement would, 
nevertheless, take steps to promote authors’ legitimate claims to a reasonable share 
of enforcement proceeds in individual cases.  For example, at the most basic level, 
courts setting damages awards could (or legislatures could direct courts to) consider 
proceeds which would have flowed to human authors but for the infringement, and 
direct intermediaries to notify affected authors and enable payment.45  This would 
be consistent with the general position in tort claims, that compensatory damages 
should compensate for harm actually suffered:  an intermediary plaintiff who 
receives damages but fails to pass on an author’s share arguably receives a 
windfall.46 
One thing we do know about these contractual relations, from the recent 
campaigning by the Authors’ Guild, that at least in the book industry, publishers 
commonly seek indemnities against litigation costs arising from allegations of the 
author’s own infringement of others’ rights, and may also require authors to obtain 
copyright clearances.47  This too creates a divergence of interests:  if common 
across industries, it could mean that on both creative and financial grounds, 
authors, far more than intermediaries, could have an interest in ensuring that 
copyright rules do not prevent authors engaging in (justifiable, creative) imitation 
 
 44.  TOWSE, supra note 5. 
 45.  For example, legislation could stipulate that any judgement or settlement awarded to a right 
holder must allow for proceeds which would have flowed to the author but for the infringement, with 
that amount required to be set aside for the author and be made available on application by the author. 
 46.  This is complex:  the costs of litigation (inter alia) mean that compensatory damages do not 
always cover the full loss. 
 47.  THE AUTHORS GUILD, supra note 6.  
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of and reference to existing canons, and overturning, or transforming, existing 
material—in order to ensure that they themselves are not plagued by frivolous 
suits.48  
B. THE AUTHOR AS THE BEARER OF MORAL AND PERSONAL INTERESTS 
Ensuring protection for authors’ direct economic interests when copyright is 
enforced is one thing, but disentangling authorial and non-authorial interests in, and 
justifications for, copyright in granting remedies becomes really interesting once 
we consider that not all interests in copyright enforcement are shared.  Some rightly 
belong to authors only,49 because the author is the bearer of moral claims in 
relation to their creative output, and this may have implications for remedies. 
Authors have a unique connection with their work:  in Hegelian terms, creative 
works uniquely are a manifestation of the creator’s personality or self.  This 
justifies the assertion of property, and some continuing stake in the work and its 
treatment and use after its sale to others.50  These moral claims are partially 
recognised in many legal systems around the world via moral rights such as the 
right to attribution and to integrity of the work, and rights of publication and 
withdrawal.51  But we can take this reasoning further.  If we believe that copyright 
works can be an extension of the self, then, to an author, ordinary copyright 
infringement can be an injury akin to other tortious affronts to the person such as 
defamation, or trespass to the person.52  If so, the author has a non-economic 
 
 48.  Remedies could be adjusted to take account of this.  See, e.g., Paul Geller, Hiroshige vs Van 
Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
OF THE U.S.A. 39 (1998) (suggesting serving authorial interests through a kind of sliding scale of 
remedies, with the most coercive remedies to be applied to mere rote copying, the least coercive 
remedies to cases involving innovative recasting of work, with cases in-between (“knowledgeable 
reworking” subject to discretionary adjustment)). 
 49.  The “disentangling” analysis draws on Rebecca Giblin’s recent approach on copyright term.  
See Rebecca Giblin, Reimagining copyright’s duration, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 
177-211 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017).  Giblin argues we could in theory 
disentangle investor and author interests, by instituting a shorter “copyright” assignable to investors 
designed to provide the minimum return required to fulfill the incentive purposes of copyright, and a 
subsequent extended “creator-right” to recognise and reward authors, that would return to the author for 
their own exploitation or assignment to the same or different investors.  
 50.  For a detailed discussion of the application of Hegelian philosophy to intellectual property, 
see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287 (1988).  Another way to 
conceive of these interests is by reference to the human rights of the author.  See Article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). 
 51.  Berne Convention, art 6bis, discussed in SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND, 
VOL I (2d ed. 2006).  
 52.  There might be some who argue that ordinary copyright infringement—reproduction and 
dissemination of the work—shows respect for the author. Some authors may indeed feel that way, 
especially in some cases of transformative or creative infringement that builds on an author’s work 
without free-riding.  It is simply facetious however to argue the author is respected in the case of 
widespread or commercial re-use of copyright material, without permission from the author, and without 
excuse.  
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interest in the recognition and vindication of that affront.  These are personal 
interests, not shared by employers or investors.53  
A desire to recognise and protect this personal interest may help explain, or 
justify, the peculiar structure of remedies available in copyright law, and in 
particular three aspects of it.  First, the tort of copyright infringement is actionable 
per se—meaning that the law treats the interests protected as sufficiently important 
that they warrant a serious remedy even without proof of any harm.54  Second, it is 
striking how readily legislatures and courts provide for civil remedies for copyright 
infringement which have the explicit goals of deterrence and punishment.  
Infringing copies can be seized and destroyed without compensation to the 
infringer,55 and so can instruments and assets used in the course of infringement, 
even where not predominantly so used.56  In some countries, a remedy known as 
conversion damages deems infringing copies to be the property of the copyright 
owner and allows that owner to recover the value of those infringing copies as if 
the infringer had misappropriated them.57 
Most striking is the availability of punitive and deterrent damages.58  Statutory 
damages in the U.S., although originally compensatory, are regularly granted in 
large sums for explicitly punitive or deterrent purposes.59  The punitive aspects of 
the remedy are reflected in a tripartite structure which sets out a default range for 
each award of $750–$30,000, but allowing for a maximum per work infringed up to 
$150,000 in the case of willful infringement, or reduction of the range in the case of 
innocent infringement.60  In the U.K. and in other jurisdictions whose legislation 
 
 53.  There are exceptions:  e.g. where the right holder to whom copyright has been assigned is a 
single director, single employee company (i.e. the corporate entity shadow of the author).  
 54.  Aristocrat Tech. Australia Pty Ltd v. DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd. (in liq) (2007) 71 IPR 
437 at 444 [39] (Austl.). 
 55.  Art. 16 of the Berne Convention requires States to provide for the seizure of infringing copies. 
The deterrent aspects of the remedy are explicitly recognized in TRIPS art. 46:  “In order to create an 
effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order that goods 
that they have found to be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the 
channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or, unless this 
would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, destroyed” (emphasis supplied).  See also 
ACTA art. 10; E.U. IP Enforcement Directive art. 10. 
 56.  See Copyright Act 1968 s 116 (Austl.); Autodesk Inc. v. Yee [1996] FCA 812; 139 ALR 735; 
T.H.W. Wells, Monetary Remedies for Infringement of Copyright, 12 ADEL. L REV. 164, 200 (1989-90), 
(outlining particularly punitive cases).  See also COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT ON 
CONVERSION DAMAGES (1990) (recommending reform to reduce the remedy’s most punitive aspects, 
which was followed in 1998).  The U.K. abolished the remedy by enacting the Copyright Designs and 
Patents Act 1998 (U.K.). 
 57. See supra note 56 and accompanying texts. 
 58. Advocate General Mengozzi Opinion in Arjona Camacho, C-407/14, EU:C:2015:534, [49]. 
 59.  F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952) (“The statutory 
rule, formulated after long experience, not merely compels restitution of profit and reparation for injury 
but also is designed to discourage wrongful conduct.” (emphasis supplied)).  See H Tomas Gomez-
Arostegui, What History Teaches Us about US Copyright Law and Statutory Damages, 5 W.I.P.O. L.J. 
76, 85 (2013); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Copyright Statutory Damages: A Remedy in Need 
of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 461-63 (2009) (noting that punishment is a common feature of 
U.S. statutory damages). 
 60.  17 U.S.C. §504(c). 
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derives from the U.K., such as Australia and New Zealand, courts can award 
additional damages.61  Although their exact nature is unclear,62 Australian and New 
Zealand courts have held that additional damages provisions can be motivated by a 
need for punishment,63 and considerations relevant only to punishment of the 
defendant rather than vindication of the plaintiff’s rights, such as flagrancy, are 
relevant under the Act.64    
A third striking aspect of copyright remedies in some countries, including both 
Australia and the U.S., is that courts award substantial damages (under the statutory 
or additional damages heads respectively) without proof of especially egregious 
behaviour.  Samuelson and Wheatland show that U.S. courts have awarded 
substantial statutory damages awards for what might be considered ordinary (rather 
than flagrant, or criminal) infringement.65  In Australia, the flagrancy of an 
infringement is relevant, but not necessary, to the award of additional damages.66 
These features of copyright remedies are difficult to explain, unless we see 
copyright law as protecting an exceptional interest, rather than mere utilitarian 
incentives.  Punishment is a controversial goal for the civil law, and often seen as 
the exclusive concern of the state, as pursued through the criminal law.67  Concern 
has been expressed regarding whether it is appropriate to apply punishment in civil 
cases where the burden of proof is lower, and procedural protections reduced.68  In 
many countries, exemplary or punitive damages are either not available as a civil 
remedy,69 or excluded or confined to certain categories of cases (a set that includes 
 
 61.  See Copyright Act 1968 s 115(4) (Austl.).  Australian courts state that additional damages are 
directed to both exemplary (punitive) and aggravated damages (given to compensate when harm done 
has been aggravated by the manner in which it is done):  Facton Ltd v. Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 95 
IPR 95, [33]–[34] (Austl.). 
 62. LAW COMMISSION, AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, 1997, 59–
60 (UK); LIONEL BENTLY AND BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1259 (4th ed. 2014). 
 63.  Wellington Newspapers Ltd v. Dealers Guide Ltd. (1984) 4 IPR 417 (CA NZ); Concrete 
Systems Pty Ltd. V. Devon Symonds Holdings Ltd (1978) 20 ALR 677 at 683 (Australia); Autodesk 
Australia Pty Ltd. v. Cheung (1990) 17 IPR 69 at 76-77 (Aus); Television Broadcasts Ltd. v. Tu (1990) 
19 IPR 307 at 321-22; Aristocrat Tech. Australia Pty Ltd. v. DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd. (in liq) 
(2007) 71 IPR 437 at 445, [48]. 
 64.  Copyright Act 1968 s 115(4)(b)(ia) (Austl.). 
 65.  F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952) (“Even for 
uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may, if it deems it just, impose a liability 
within statutory limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy”); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra 
note 59. 
 66.  Raben Footwear v. Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88, 93, 103; Polygram Pty Ltd., 
Island Records Ltd. & A & M Records Inc. v. Golden Editions Pty Ltd. (1997) 76 FCR 565, 575; Sony 
Entm’t (Australia) Ltd. v. Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788; Aristocrat Tech. Australia Pty Ltd. v. DAP 
Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 71 IPR 437, 444. 
 67.  LAW COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 97–99; Allan Beever, The Structure of Aggravated and 
Exemplary Damages, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 87 (2003) 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law – Tendencies towards 
Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 105, 107 (noting the 
German Federal Supreme Court has stated that sanctions serving the purposes of punishment serve to 
protect the general legal order, and that falls under the state’s monopoly on punishment); Pamela 
Samuelson, Phil Hill & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages:  A Rarity in International Law, But For 
How Long? 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. OF U.S.A. 529 (2013). 
WEATHERALL, AUTHOR-CENTERED COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT?, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 545 (2018) 
556 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:3 
torts that protect the integrity and dignity of the individual, such as defamation or 
trespass to the person),70 and/to only the most egregious cases.71  It is hard to argue 
that the interests of investors in cultural products are so important (and so much 
more important than the interests of commercial parties in other areas of the 
economy) that they warrant this kind of special treatment.  The best explanation for 
this part of copyright’s remedy structure is that in addition to seeking to remedy 
economic harms, it also protects the personal, moral interests of authors.72 
But if this is right—if it is authorial interests that justify the punitive nature of 
copyright remedies—there is no principled reason why the resulting monetary 
rewards should go to an investor.73  An author-centered copyright enforcement 
system would seek to direct such damages to the author, rather than whomever 
happens to own the copyright at the time.74  This would ensure that copyright 
defendants are still deterred or punished, but would grant the windfall to the party 
the harm to whose personal and moral interests justify the award.  The idea of 
directing damages to a party other than the right holder or plaintiff is certainly 
unorthodox, but not entirely unheard of.  The U.K. Law Commission when 
considering exemplary damages in 1997 considered, for example, directing that 
some proportion of an exemplary damages award be directed to the state.75 
Two key complications are immediately obvious.  First, sums awarded in 
damages serving a punitive goal in both Australia (in additional damages) and the 
U.S. (in statutory damages awards) also simultaneously serve a range of other 
purposes.  In Australia, additional damages may also provide compensation for loss 
that is “not merely economic”:  e.g. for injury to author’s reputation or feelings,76 
 
 70.  This was previously the approach in the United Kingdom under Rookes v. Barnard. But see 
Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 AC 122 [63] 
(abandoning the categorical approach, but characterising punitive damages as a remedy of last resort).  
For a comparative discussion, see James Goudkamp & John Murphy, The Failure of Universal Theories 
of Tort Law, 21(2) LEGAL THEORY 47 (2015). 
 71.  See James Goudkamp & John Murphy, The Failure of Universal Theories of Tort Law, 21(2) 
LEGAL THEORY 47 (2015). 
 72.  See Beever, supra note 67 (arguing that the most serious kind of (private) wrong involves 
injury to the plaintiff’s moral dignity, resulting from the defendant’s denial that the victim is entitled to 
respect as a moral person.  Beever’s example of such a wrong is assault).  See also Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1, 27-29 (2000). 
 73.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that the fact that punitive damages generate 
a windfall is often cited as a reason punitive damages should not be available at all—but this is 
exacerbated in copyright if the damages are not even flowing to the person who has been relevantly 
wronged). 
 74.  This could also be done by refusing punitive damages to right holders who are not authors.  
But this would reduce deterrence; it would also be inconsistent with some more recent additions to the 
international legal framework.  Many recent bilateral trade agreements, and recently negotiated 
plurilateral agreements require that statutory damages be available on the election of the right holder, 
and that they be available in all copyright infringement cases (including for subject matter without a 
human author, such as sound recordings).  See, e.g., ACTA art 9.3; Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
art 17.1.7; TPP art 18.74.6.  
 75.  LAW COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 141–44. 
 76.  Nichols Advanced Vehicle Sys. Inc. v. Rees [1979] RPC 127 (rivals copied racing car, 
gaining fame for own team and inflicting humiliation); Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty Ltd. (1994) 54 FCR 
240.  
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for vulgarisation of the work,77 or activity that undermines the exclusivity and 
success of the claimant.78  In some cases too it has been clear that the availability of 
additional damages has assisted a court to provide effective compensation where 
ordinary damages were hard to calculate.79  Statutory damages in the U.S. are, of 
course, explicitly designed to provide compensation in cases where quantification 
of harm is difficult or impossible.  And even in relation to damages that are 
explicitly punitive, courts have recognised that damages serve a purpose of 
appeasement and to assuage the feelings of the wronged party:  reasoning that 
might also apply to a non-authorial right holder.80  Without seeking to make light 
of the difficulty involved in seeking to disentangle these various motivations, at 
least in theory this problem could be overcome if damages awards were granted 
more explicitly to distinguish—however rough the justice might need to be—
between punitive and compensatory aspects. 
Second, removing a significant component of the damages award available to 
investors might reduce their incentive to enforce copyright, and increase the 
likelihood of settlement in ways that would undermine benefits to authors.  This 
would be contrary to the author’s economic interests and defeat the purpose of 
redirection.  It may not seem fair to ask right holders to bear the entire risk of 
litigation, just so that an author could come in at the last moment to reap damages 
that went beyond compensation.  It might be possible to address these concerns 
through some appropriate division of punitive aspects of the award.81  In any event, 
the purpose of this paper is not to set out the finer details of any model or system, 
but rather, to point out that there are, potentially, ways that remedies in copyright 
currently merge the interests of authors into those of right holders—and that “de-
merger” might create a more author-centered system. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
I have argued that there is flexibility in the international legal framework 
addressing copyright enforcement to address the purposes of copyright, and to 
serve the interests of stakeholders in the system other than just right holders—
including authors.  I have sought also to make some specific suggestions to 
illustrate the point that thinking about the interests of authors specifically does open 
up different ideas for enforcement reform. 
 
 77.  Conde Nast Publ’n Ltd. v. Jaffe, 1951 (1) SA 81 at 87 (S. Africa). 
 78.  ZYX Music GmbH v. King [1995] FSR 566. 
 79.  See, e.g., Aristocrat Tech. Australia Pty Ltd. v. DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd. (in liq) 
(2007) 71 IPR 437.  The court concluded that in the absence of proof of quantified loss, the plaintiff was 
entitled to nominal damages only.  The court assessed additional damages at $200,000:  $105,000 
reflected profit made by the defendant, with an uplift to reflect flagrancy and mark the court’s 
disapproval.  
 80.  See Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; Merest v. Harvey (1814) 5 Taunt 442; 128 ER 761; 
W v. W [1999] 2 NZLR 1, 3 (PC). 
 81.  One mechanism to deal with this would be to craft a statute to allow authors up to fifty 
percent of damages awarded beyond compensation contingent upon the proportion which they decided 
to contribute to enforcement costs.  This would provide a scaling mechanism which would give authors 
greater incentive to contribute and flexibility in decision making.  
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The ideas presented here are illustrative only, and we could no doubt think of 
others.  States could, for example, make protection of authors’ interests a core 
consideration in deciding how to distribute the scare resources of government 
enforcement agencies.  For example, the State could direct prosecutors to focus on 
cases where authors specifically have suffered substantial detriment.  The State 
could also allocate greater funding to facilitate enforcement action in circumstances 
where authors own copyright but lack the resources to enforce their rights.82  
Parallel to this, governments could choose to direct any fines or penalties derived 
from criminal enforcement in the direction of human authors and creators.  These 
funds could be applied to compensate authors affected by the criminal 
infringement, or allocated to creative organisations which promote authorship, for 
example through author grants, training or other services.  Given the rapid growth 
of international provisions relating to enforcement, governments could also actively 
adopt an author-centric approach to drafting new international enforcement rules.  
If, for example, like the parties that negotiated ACTA, government representatives 
are writing provisions to encourage private solutions, or if, like the E.U., 
government representatives are drafting provisions to require online intermediaries 
to proactively enforce copyright, then they should at least think about the potential 
impacts on creators, and how to fix them.  Some more recent private enforcement 
tools are simply inaccessible to human creators.83  Possibly too we should be 
thinking beyond reform by courts or legislatures.  Ideas in this paper could inform, 
for example, initiatives to push for fair contracts initiated by representative bodies.  
No short piece could hope to be comprehensive, and in any particular proposed 
reform, there are many details to consider, and other stakeholders. 
As I set out at the start:  the point of this paper is not to propose a model, but to 
show that it is possible to think about enforcement in terms other than as a zero 
sum game pitting undifferentiated copyright interests against everyone else.  But 
authors are at the heart of the copyright system, and a core reason given for 
ongoing efforts to improve that system.  They should not disappear once their 
creative acts are complete. 
 
 82.  See TRIPS art 41.5 (States may choose how they distribute their law enforcement resources). 
 83.  Some modern systems for enforcement online, for example, have been structured as 
voluntary, cooperative efforts between large right holders (music or film companies) and intermediaries:  
a structure which excludes direct access for individual human creators. See, e.g., Marianne Grant, 
Voluntary Mechanisms for Addressing Online Infringement, World Intellectual Property Organization 
Advisory Committee on Enforcement, WIPO/ACE/9/27 (Feb. 18, 2014), https://perma.cc/K5E3-FH8L 
(discussing the U.S. Copyright Alert system, subsequently discontinued); Jennifer M. Urban, Joe 
Karaganis, & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice 60–61 (UC Berkeley 
Public Law Research Paper No. 2755628, 2017).  Other recent voluntary systems provide procedural 
advantages to sophisticated users.  See generally Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis, & Brianna L. 
Schofield, Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice 54-55 (U.C. Berkeley Public Law Research Paper 
No. 2755628, 2017) (describing trusted sender and direct takedown systems). 
